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Abstract
E-mail prioritization involves placing all of the ‘useful’
or ‘good’ unread e-mails at the top of the inbox, and
all of the bad ones at the bottom. We use two cog-
nitive decision models—a rational model, which con-
siders all of the available information, and a fast and
frugal model that uses one reason decision making—
to prioritize e-mails. Experimental results, using real
data obtained by unobtrusively logging e-mail user be-
havior, show that the fast and frugal model is just as
eﬀective as the rational model. The results also show
that a Bayesian approach to learning is superior to the
standard frequentist approach, because it balances the
competing demands of exploration and exploitation in
ﬁnding good e-mails. We use the results to draw some
applied conclusions about the development of an e-
mail prioritization system, and note some theoretical
implications of the results for the cognitive modeling
of human decision making in general.
Introduction
Anybody who has returned from holidays to be con-
fronted with 600 unread e-mails appreciates the need
for prioritization. Ideally, we would like an unread
inbox to rank the e-mails, putting those that are the
most ‘important’, ‘urgent’, ‘useful’ or ‘good’ at the top,
and those that are less important at the bottom.
While machine learning methods have been applied
to the problem of e-mail prioritization (e.g., Macskassy,
Dayanik, & Hirsh 1999; Mehran, Dumais, Heckerman,
& Horvitz 1998), it has typically not been treated as a
cognitive modeling problem. Clearly, however, priori-
tizing requires an ability to predict whether or not a
user is likely to evaluate a message as a good message,
and so requires an eﬀective model of human decision
making to be successful.
Using cognitive models for prioritization does not
only promise to provide an answer to an applied prob-
lem, but also has theoretical beneﬁts for the more gen-
eral study of human decision making processes. This
is because, in the form of real-world e-mails, it deals
with a richly structured stimulus domain. There are,
of course advantages in studying decision making with
artiﬁcial stimuli, as is often done in the categorization
and classiﬁcation literature (e.g., Shepard, Hovland,
& Jenkins 1961), because of the experimental control
that is achievable. A central argument of ecological ap-
proaches (e.g., Simon 1956; Gigerenzer & Todd 1999),
however, is that it is also important to consider the role
of non-arbitrary stimulus environments in supporting
(or confounding) human decision making.
In this paper, we develop and evaluate two cognitive
models for prioritization. One is a ‘rational’ model,
that performs exhaustive calculations, while the other
is a ‘fast and frugal’ model, that requires only lim-
ited time by making assumptions about the nature of
its environment. In the next section, we describe how
e-mails are represented by these models, and how in-
formation about them is learned. We then describe the
two models in detail, before presenting the results of an
experiment in which both are evaluated on real-world
data. Finally, we draw some conclusions regarding the
theoretical implications of the results for understand-
ing human decision making, and the applied implica-
tions for building an e-mail prioritization system.
E-mail Representation and Learning
Cues and Cue Validities
We follow previous research in assuming e-mails are
represented in terms of a set of binary features, which
we call cues. These cues may relate to the content of
the e-mail, such as a keyword in the message text, or
metadata associated with the e-mail, such as the name
of the sender. In this way, each e-mail may be deﬁned
by the set of cues that it contains.
Following Gigerenzer and Todd (1999), we associate
a cue validity with each cue, which measures the prob-
ability that an e-mail will be regarded as good, given
that it has the cue. Formally, this means that the va-
lidity, vi of the i-th cue, ci is deﬁned as vi ≡ p (G | ci),
where G denotes good. Notice that, because each e-
mail is assumed to be either good or bad, 1− vi gives
the p (B | ci), the probability that an e-mail will be bad
when it has the i-th cue.
Learning Cue Validities
Where the cues constitute the representational com-
ponent of our decision making models, the way in
which the validities are speciﬁed constitute the learn-
ing processes, in the sense that diﬀerent validities ap-
ply in diﬀerent environments, and are formed on the
basis of information observed in those environments.
We consider two methods for learning cue validities,
arising from the alternative frequentist and Bayesian
statistical approaches. In both cases, we assume that
(in ways described later) every e-mail that has previ-
ously been processed by a user has been classed as a
good e-mail or a bad e-mail. This means that the raw
data for the i-th cue take the form of a count gi, giving
the number of good e-mails with the cue, and a count
bi, giving the number of bad e-mails with the cue.
Under the frequentist approach, the validity of a cue
is estimated simply as the proportion of good e-mails
with the cue:
vˆi = gi/ (gi + bi + ) ,
where  is a small positive number that ensures cues
have a deﬁned validity of zero before they have been
observed in any e-mail (i.e., the case gi = bi = 0).
Under the Bayesian approach, prior beliefs regarding
the validity of the i-th cue are modiﬁed using the data
provided by the counts gi and bi. As a cue becomes
associated with more good e-mails, higher values for
its validity become more likely. Conversely, as a cue
becomes associated with more bad e-mails, lower val-
ues for its validity become more likely. Bayes’ theorem
describes the way in which the prior beliefs are modi-
ﬁed by data to give a probability distribution over the
range [0, 1] of possible validities. Deﬁning the validity
of a cue as the mean of this distribution, and assuming
a uniform prior, gives the result (see Gelman, Carlin,
Stern, & Rubin 1995, p. 31):
vˆi = E [p (vi | gi, bi)] = gi + 1
gi + bi + 2
.
As more e-mails with the i-th cue are processed
the counts gi and bi increase, and the frequentist and
Bayesian approaches converge towards the same value.
When few data are available, however, we later show
that the Bayesian approach has advantages for priori-
tization.
Decision Models for Prioritization
The ‘Rational’ Approach
Under the rational approach to decision making used
here, the evidence provided by every cue associated
with an e-mail is integrated to give an estimate of the
overall log odds that the e-mail is good, as opposed
to bad. Assuming that the evidence provided by each
cue is independent, and that the prior probabilities of
an e-mail being good or bad are equal, then Bayes’
theorem gives:
ln
p (G | c1, ..., cn)
p (B | c1, ..., cn) = ln
n∏
i=1
p (G | ci)




p (ci | G)
p (ci | B) .
The required evidence ratios p (ci | G) /p (ci | B) can
be estimated from the data in the same way as cue va-
lidities, or (with some manipulation) written in terms
of the validities themselves. The rational approach has
the attraction of considering all of the data, in the
sense that it considers the evidence provided by every
cue associated with every stimulus. For this reason,
it is often considered a normative account of decision
making, and has been used extensively (in one form
or another) to model human decision making. As an
(arbitrary) example, consider Kruschke’s (1992) well
known ALCOVE model, which uses a weighted sum of
the evidence provided by each dimension of a stimulus
in deciding whether or not that stimulus belongs to a
category. The rational approach is also widely used
in machine learning, and has been applied in previous
research (Macskassy et al. 1999; Mehran et al. 1998)
on prioritizing e-mails.
The ‘Fast and Frugal’ Approach
In developing their ‘fast and frugal’ approach to model-
ing human decision making, however, Gigerenzer and
Todd (1999) challenge the rational approach. They
argue that because human decision making processes
evolved in a competitive environment, they need to
be fast, and because they evolved in a changeable
environment, they need to have the robustness that
comes from simplicity. To meet these challenges, the
fast and frugal approach adopts Simon’s (1982) notion
of ‘bounded rationality’, and models human decision
making using simple algorithms that rely on an as-
sumed structure in the stimulus environment to func-
tion eﬀectively.
For example, in an environment where the validity
of one stimulus cue is highly predictive of the validi-
ties of the remaining cues, and the examination of
additional cues is an eﬀortful process, it is sensible
to consider only the ﬁrst cue. Similarly, in an envi-
ronment of diminishing returns, where the examina-
tion of each successive cue provides less information
than previous cues, it makes sense to base decisions
on a small number of cues. Gigerenzer and Todd
(1999) show that many real-world stimulus domains
have these sorts of structures, and develop a number of
cognitive models—including the ‘Take the Best’ model
of forced choice, the ‘QuickEst’ model of value estima-
tion, and the ‘Categorization by Elimination’ model
of categorization—that make inferences by assuming
environmental regularities.
Unfortunately, none of these models is directly ap-
plicable to the problem of e-mail prioritization, and so
we developed a new model using the basic ‘fast and fru-
gal’ modeling approach. Gigerenzer and Todd (1999)
argue that their models of human decision making are
based on simple mechanisms that answer three funda-
mental questions:
• How should a stimulus environment be searched for
information?
• When should this search for information be termi-
nated?
• Once the search has been terminated, what decision
should be made given the available information?
In the context of ﬁnding good unread e-mails, as
required for priorization, it is not diﬃcult to provide
answers to these questions:
• Unread e-mails should be searched in terms of cues,
looking for e-mails with high validity cues.
• The search should be terminated as soon as at a can-
didate good e-mail has been identiﬁed. Since users
process e-mails serially, there is no beneﬁt in seek-
ing to sort the unread e-mails, beyond attempting to
ensure that at any time the top-most e-mail is the
one most likely to be good.
• The best available e-mail should be placed at the
top of the inbox, as the next one to be read by the
user.
These answers suggest a simple fast and frugal de-
cision model for prioritization. The cues are ordered
in terms of their estimated validity and, starting with
the highest validity, a search is made for an unread
e-mail that has this cue. If this search is successful,
the process terminates without considering any fur-
ther cues. If no e-mail is found, the search continues
using the next highest validity cue, and this process is
repeated until an e-mail is found. This model is closely
related to Take the Best, and belongs to the class of
what Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) term ‘one reason de-
cision making’ models. Only one reason, in the form
of the presence of a high validity cue, is all that is
required to ﬁnd the next e-mail for presentation.
Experiment
Data Collection
We developed a macro for the Microsoft Outlook e-
mail application that unobtrusively logged the behav-
ior of one user for a period of 76 consecutive days.
This logging involved recording the actions made by
the user in reading, responding to, and organizing the
e-mails in their inbox. Every time the user replied to,
forwarded, saved, moved or deleted an e-mail in their
inbox, an entry in a log ﬁle was made. Often, a partic-
ular e-mail was subjected to several processing actions
Table 1: The logged e-mail properties used to generate







Sender’s name “SendersName=John Lee”
Subject keyword “Subject=upgrade”
Addressee list “To=Ben Stamley”
over time, such as being forwarded, and then deleted.
We used an operational deﬁnition of what makes an
e-mail a good or bad one, based on these processing
sequences, to enable each e-mail to be labeled as ei-
ther good or bad. If an e-mail was ever printed, for-
warded, replied to, copied to another folder, or saved,
it was regarded as a good e-mail. Otherwise, when
the e-mail was only deleted, it was regarded as bad.
Of course, this sort of operational deﬁnition is not un-
problematic, but we believe it represents a reasonable
ﬁrst-order approximation for identifying those e-mails
that are more ‘important’, ‘useful’ or ‘urgent’.
The properties of the e-mails being manipulated
were also recorded, providing the subject text of the
e-mail (for ethical reasons no message content was
recorded), as well as metadata identifying the sender
of the e-mail, whether it had an attachment, and so
on. Those properties taking discrete values were used
to generate the cues for representing e-mails by pairing
the property with each possible value. Table 1 details
the eight properties used in this way, together with an
example of a cue for each. The only pre-processing
used in generating these cues was to remove common
English words from the subject text using a ‘stopword’
list. The ﬁnal data set contained 886 e-mails, 362 of
which were good, deﬁned in terms of 3,112 binary cues.
Eﬀectiveness of Prioritization
Both the rational and the fast and frugal models were
applied to the e-mail data, using the Bayesian learn-
ing approach. Each day’s e-mails were prioritized
in sequence, to simulate the eﬀect that prioritization
would have if it were implemented on-line. Figure 1
summarizes the results of 10 independent applications
of each method using an eﬀort-reward graph. The
performance curves relate hypothetical levels of ‘ef-
fort’, which describe the proportion of available e-mails
processed by the user, to the resultant level of reward,
as measured by the proportion of available good e-
mails that are found. Mean performance levels are
shown by the curve, with best- and worse-case perfor-



















Figure 1: Eﬀort-reward performance of the rational
and ‘fast and frugal’ decision models.
mance, arising from the stochastic process of breaking
ties, indicated by error bars (where large enough to be
visible).
Without prioritization, good e-mails are evenly dis-
tributed according to their base-rate of occurrence,
which corresponds to the diagonal line in Figure 1.
The best- and worse-case possible eﬀort-reward perfor-
mance of prioritization are shown by the dotted lines,
which correspond, respectively, to the cases where all
good e-mails are presented ﬁrst, and where all bad
e-mails are presented ﬁrst. Figure 1 shows that the
rational and the fast and frugal model perform very
similarly. They are close to optimal for the ﬁrst 10-
20% of good e-mails, but then perform less impres-
sively, although they continue to provide a signiﬁcant
advantage over non-prioritized presentation. Reading
the ﬁrst 50% of e-mails, for example, results in ﬁnding
approximately 75-80% of the good e-mails available.
Figure 1 suggests two important conclusions.
Firstly, it shows that prioritization is eﬀective, which
suggests that human decisions in processing the e-mails
have some level of systematic relationship with the var-
ious cues by which the e-mails are represented. Sec-
ond, the fast and frugal approach is approximately as
eﬀective as the rational approach, which suggests that
the human decision making process can be understood
in terms of the identiﬁcation of key features of the e-
mails, rather than the exhaustive integration of all of
their properties.



















Figure 2: Eﬀort-reward performance of the ‘fast and
frugal’ model using Bayesian and frequentist learning.
Bayesian and Frequentist Learning
An important theoretical problem for prioritization re-
lates to the balance between exploitation and explo-
ration processes. In the context of e-mail prioritiza-
tion, exploitation involves using cues that are known
to have some validity to ﬁnd good e-mails, while explo-
ration involves learning more about cues for which lit-
tle or nothing is known, in the hope of ﬁnd new sources
of good e-mails. Prioritization algorithms are of lim-
ited use if they achieve their results by exploitation at
the expense of exploration, particularly in dynamically
changing environments. For this reason, there has
been some considerable eﬀort in the machine learning
literature (see Sutton and Barto 1998) to balance the
competing demands of exploitation and exploration,
usually by introducing some stochastic element into
the search process.
As it turns out, the Bayesian approach to learning
validities addresses this problem. Figure 2 shows the
eﬀort-reward performance of 10 runs of the fast and
frugal model using both the Bayesian and the frequen-
tist approaches. To assist in the exposition of our sub-
sequent analyses, only a limited set of cues, consisting
of all of those generated from the easily understood
‘Senders Name’ ﬁeld were used. As Figure 2 shows,
the Bayesian approach performs better, particularly
for eﬀort levels greater than about 0.5.
The reason for the superiority of the Bayesian va-
lidity estimate can be demonstrated through a con-
crete example. On day 43, a (small) total of ﬁve e-
Table 2: Sender cues, good (G) and bad (B) counts,
and estimated Bayesian and frequentist validities for
day 43.
Sender’s Name G B Bayes Freq.
ABC News Online 1 140 0.01 0.01
Scott Brown 1 0 0.67 1.00
Tapes Subliminales 0 0 0.50 0.00
Virtual Florist 0 1 0.33 0.00
W. Paul Malcolm 0 0 0.50 0.00
mails required prioritization, coming from ﬁve diﬀer-
ent senders. Of these senders, three had previously
sent e-mails: “Scott Brown” had sent one good e-mail,
“Virtual Florist” had sent one bad e-mail, and “ABC
News Online” had sent 141 e-mails, only one of which
had ever been good. These patterns of good and bad
counts, together with their Bayesian and frequentist
cue validity estimates, are shown in Table 2.
Under the frequentist approach, the “Scott Brown”
e-mail will be presented ﬁrst, because it has been as-
sociated with the highest proportion of good e-mails.
The next e-mail presented will be the “ABC News On-
line” e-mail, because it has the next highest estimated
validity, by virtue of being the only other sender ever
to provide a good e-mail. The remaining two unknown
senders have estimated validities of zero, and so their
e-mails will be presented in random order. As it hap-
pens, one of these e-mails, from the new sender “W.
Paul Malcolm” is a good one, and so prioritization
will be ineﬀective. Fundamentally, this is because fre-
quentist validity estimation favors the exploitation of
sources with very limited returns over the exploration
of unknown sources.
Using the Bayesian approach, the “Scott Brown” e-
mail will again be presented ﬁrst, because it has the
highest estimated validity. However, “Virtual Florist”
and (especially) “ABC News Online” e-mails will not
be presented until after those from the senders about
whom nothing is known, because their validities are
below the 0.5 prior. In this way, the potential new
sources of good e-mails will be explored before those
that are known to have limited returns are exploited.
Notice also that the “Virtual Florist” e-mail will be
presented before the “ABC News Online” e-mail, be-
cause less data is available for estimating the validity
of the former, and so it has more scope to achieve a
higher estimate as more observations are made (i.e., it
is more worthy of further exploration).
The Structure of the Environment
An analysis of the e-mail stimulus domain explains why
the fast and frugal approach performs similarly to the
rational approach. Figure 3 shows the relationship be-
tween the mean estimated validity of the cues associ-



















Figure 3: The relationship between the maximum cue
validity for an e-mail, and its mean cue validity.
ated with each message (using Bayesian learning), and
the maximum estimated validity. There is a positive
correlation of r = 0.80 between these measures, in-
dicating that the maximum cue validity, as used by
the fast and frugal method. is highly predictive of the
validities of the remaining cues considered by the ra-
tional method. This environmental regularity is the
reason for the success of the fast and frugal model: By
ﬁnding the unread e-mail with the greatest cue valid-
ity, it does not need to consider further cues, because
their validities are largely already determined by the
maximum value.
Future Work
The outstanding problem relates to adaptation. If
the characteristics of the external e-mail environ-
ment change (e.g., people send diﬀerent types of e-
mails), or the user changes the way they regard e-
mails as good or bad, prioritization needs to reﬂect
the new situation. The learning processes used in
our study will be slow to adapt to these sorts of
changes, as demonstrated for the Bayesian approach
by the pattern of change of the ﬁve cues shown in Fig-
ure 4. Validities for the “To=Mike Lee” and “Sub-
ject=newmail” cues are learned eﬀectively, because
they are consistently evaluated by the user. The
“To=fairycake85@hotmail.com” cue, however, is eval-
uated as good in the ﬁrst two weeks, but its change to
a bad cue is learned slowly. Meanwhile, the cues “Sub-
ject=swinburne” and “To=doug.vickers” have similar























Figure 4: The pattern of change over all processing
days for ﬁve cues, using Bayesian learning.
estimated validities at day 76, yet there are grounds
to be more conﬁdent about the accuracy of the latter,
since it is based on a signiﬁcant volume of recent data,
while the former has not been seen since about day 22.
The ability to adapt requires that memory processes
be introduced into the cognitive decision models. By
replacing old information in the counts gi and bi with
new information, giving greater weight to new informa-
tion, or forcing information to decay over time, validity
estimates will be based on data that reﬂects the current
state of aﬀairs. A large variety of memory mechanisms
have been proposed and evaluated for simple psycho-
logical decision models (e.g., Pietsch & Vickers 1997),
and a detailed empirical evaluation of these possibili-
ties is a priority for future research. The other obvious
area of future research is to extend our evaluation to
a larger number of users.
Conclusion
We argued in the Introduction that using cognitive de-
cision models to prioritize e-mails provided a way to
address an applied problem, and also advance our the-
oretical understanding of human decision making. We
conclude by suggesting some implications of our results
on both the applied and theoretical fronts.
In terms of developing an e-mail prioritization ap-
plication, the fast and frugal model has enormous po-
tential. The data required to drive the algorithm, in
the form of user evaluations of good and bad e-mails, is
done entirely unobtrusively, does not require any addi-
tional user eﬀort, and provides a continual on-line data
source that should allow for adaptation. The balance
between exploration and exploitation is handled natu-
rally by the Bayesian approach to validity estimation,
and the nature of the fast and frugal algorithm means
that it will scale to large problems. Only one e-mail
with one cue needs to be found at each stage of prioriti-
zation, as compared with the rational approach, which
examines every cue of every e-mail at every stage.
Theoretically, our results suggest that human deci-
sion making in processing e-mails can be understood
in terms of a one reason decision making process that
is tuned to regularities in its environment, and so sup-
ports Gigerenzer and Todd’s (1999) fast and frugal ap-
proach to cognitive modeling. The Bayesian approach
to validity estimation also provides a theoretical tool
for any learning or decision making situation where
exploration must be balanced with exploitation, and
could well be used in other cognitive decision models.
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